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THE AMERICAN

LAW INSTITUTE'S

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
ANNOTATED WITH KENTUCKY
DECISIONS*
By FRANK MURRAY**

Section 40.

VHAT

LAPSE OF TIME TERmiNATES AN OFFER.

1. The power to create a contract by acceptance of an
offer terminates at the time specified in the offer, or, if no time
is specified, at the end of a reasonable time.
2. What is a reasonable time is a question of fact, depending on the nature of the contract proposed, the usages of business and other circumstances of the case winch the offeree at
the time of his acceptance either knows or has reason to know.
3. In the absence of usage or a provision in the offer to
the contrary, and subject to the rule stated in Section 51, an
offer sent by mail is seasonably accepted if an acceptance is
mailed at any time during the day of which the offer is
received.
Comment
a. An offeror may fix any time that he wishes as that
within whnch acceptance must be made. He need not make the
time a reasonable one. If, however, no time is fixed the offeree
is justified in assuming that a reasonable time is intended, and
the law adopts this assumption.
here a bilateral contract is contemplated a reasonb.
able time for making the return promise requested is generally
brief. Especially is this true in regard to commercial contracts.
c. Where a unilateral contract is contemplated, assent to
the proposition is manifested by performing or refraining from
*This is a continuation of the Kentucky annotations to the Restatement of the Law of Contracts. The work is being done by Professor Frank Murray of the College of Law, University of Kentucky,
in cooperation with the Kentucky State Bar Association. Other installments will follow in subsequent issues.
**Frank Murray, A. B., Univ. of Montana; LL. B. 1925, Univ. of
Montana, S. J. D. 1930, Harvard Univ., Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of
Montana School of Law, 1928-1929; Prof. of Law, Univ. of Kenfucky
College of Law since 1930.
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performnng an act, and a reasonable time for so doing is necessarily a reasonable time for acceptance. If, therefore, in the
nature of the case what is requested cannot be done without
considerable delay, the time within which acceptance may be
made is equally long.
Annotation
(1) The power of creating a contract by acceptance of the offer
Is terminated by *the lapse of the time stated in the offer. Postal Tel.
Co. v. LoussviZle C. H. Oil Co., 140 Ky. 506, 131 S. W 277 (1910), s'tembridge v. Stembridge's Adm., 87 Ky. 91, 7 S. W 611 (1888). See also
Gold Sprng Distl. Co. v. Stitzel Distl., 150 Ky. 457, 150 S. W 516 (1912),
and cases there cited. This is true although a consideration is paid
for the offer. Fields and Combs v. Vizard Invest. Co., 168 Ky. 744, 182
S. W 934 (1916), Tevzs v. Nugent, 22 K. L. R. 894, 59 S. W 9.
If no time is specified in the offer, the power of creating a contract by acceptance is terminated by the lapse of a reasonable time.
Moxley's Adm. v. Moxley, 59 Ky. (2 Metc.) 309 (1859), Chiles v. Nelson,
37 Ky. (7 Dana.) 281 (1836), Hutcheson v. Blakeman, 60 Ky. (3 Metc.)
80 (1860).
(2) What is a reasonable time is a question of fact depending
on the circumstances of the case. Mitchell - Co. v. Wallace, 27 K. L. R.
967, 87 S. W 303 (1905), Moxley's Adm. v. Moxley, supra. It is said
"the inquiry as to a reasonable time resolves itself into an inquiry as
to what time it is rational to suppose that the parties contemplated;
and the law will decide this to be that time which, as rational men,
they ought to have understood each other to have in mind." Moxley
v. Moxley's Adm., supra; Paducah Packing Co. v. -T. T Polk Co., 30 K.
L. R. 979, 99 S. W 929 (1904).
(3) Subsection (3) states, as a matter of law, if the offer is by
mail, that, in the absence of usage or a provision in the contract, an
acceptance posted on the day the offer is received is seasonable. This
statement is supported by the decision in Mitchell & Co. v. Wallace,
supra. Of course, a later acceptance may be valid under the rule stated
in subsection (2) as shown by the cases there cited and Hutcheson v.
Blakeman, 60 Ky (3 Metc.) 80.

Section 41. REVOCATION BY Comu-mCATION PiROM OFFEREn
RECEIVED BY OFERFE.
Revocation of an offer may be made by a communication
from the offeror received by the offeree which states or implies
that the offeror no longer intends to enter into the proposed
contract, if the commmncation is received by the offeree before
he has exercised his power of creating a contract by acceptance
of the offer.
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comment
a. Revocation, as stated in Section 35, does not terminate
an offer m cases within the rules stated in Sections 45, 46, and
47.
b. What amounts to receipt of revocation within the meaning of the rule is considered in Section 69.
Annotatwon
"A mere proposal
may therefore be withdrawn at any
time before acceptance, though, if such offer is allowed to remain open
until accepted, it will become a binding contract
The right to
revoke an ordinary offer before acceptance is unquestioned." Walton's
Exr v. Franks, 191 Ky. 32 at p. 35, 228 S. W 1025 (1921). See also
Nolin Milling Go. v. White Gro. Co., 168 Ky. 417, 182 S. W 191 (1916),
L. A. Becker Co. v. Alvey, 27 K. L. R. 832, 86 S. W 974 (1905), and
Burton v. Shotwefl, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 271 (1877). This is true although
the offer is expressly made for a definite time or although there is a
promise to keep the offer open, if the promise is without consideration.
Stamper v. Combs, 164 Ky. 733, 176 S. W. 178 (1915), Litz v. Goosling,
93 Ky. 185, 19 S. W 527 (1892), Noble v. Mann, 32 K. L. R. 30, 105
S. W. 152 (1907).

Section 42. AcQuisimTo BY OF'EREu OF IN-FoRmA0T HAo
T
OFFEROR HAS SOLD OR CONTRACTED TO SELL OFERED INTEREST.
Where an offer is for the sale of a property interest of any
kind, if the offeror, after making the offer, sells or contracts to
sell the interest to another person, and the offeree acquires
reliable information of that fact, the offer is revoked.
Comment
a. Since revocation does not termnate offers falling within
the rules stated in Sections 45, 46 and 47, the present section
has no application to such offers.
Annotatwn
Even if there is an unsupported promise to keep the offer open
for a definite time, the sale of the land to another is a repudiation of
the "option." Noble v. Mann, 32 K. L. R. 30, 105 S. W 152 (1907). In
this decision nothing is said as to the method by which the offeree
acquired information of the sale, but an other cases it is stated that
the acceptance must be made "before any intimation is received that
the offer is withdrawn." Hutcheson v. Blakeman, 60 Ky. (3 Metc.) 80
(1860), Shaw v. Ingram-Day Lbr Co., 152 Ky. 329, 335, 153 S. W 431
(1913). In Stamper v. Combs, 164 Ky. 733, 176 S. W 178 (1915), an

A. L. I.
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indirect commumcation of offeror's intention to revoke was said to be

suffcient.
It has been held that a written offer given for a consideration to
sell land at a stated price, witln a limited time, if given to a.broker
is irrevocable and that a sale of the land to another acts as a revocation. FaradayCoal & Coke Co. v. Owens, 26 K. . R. 243, 80 S. W
1171 (1904), or even the giving of an option has this effect. Chesbrough
v. Vizard iv. Co., 156 Ky. 149, 160 S. W. 725 (1913).

Section 43. HOW AN 0s'R MADE By ADVERTISEm NT op.
GENERALJ NOTICE MAY BE REVOKED.
An offer made by advertisement in a newspaper, or by a
general notice to the public or to a number of persons whose
identity is unknown to the offeror, is revoked by an advertisement or general notice giving publicity equal to that given to
the offer.
Comment
a. In the case of such an offer as is stated in this section,
revocation is not likely to be inoperative within the rules stated
in Sections 45 and 46, but the rule stated in Section 47 may
prevent a revocation within the rule of the present section from
being operative.
Annotation
No Kentucky cases.

Section 44. REVOCATION
SERIES OF CONTRACTS.

OF

OFFER

CONTEMPLATING

A

A revocable offer contemplating a series of independent
contracts by separate acceptances may be effectively revoked
so as to terminate the power to create future contracts, though
one or more of the proposed contracts have already been formed
by the offeree's acceptance.
comment
a. An offer may propose several contracts, to arise at separate times (see Section 30) Such an offer is divisible, and the
power to make an effective revocation continues part passt with
the continuing power of the offeree to accept.
b. 'Where an offer contemplates a series of unilateral con-
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tracts, beginning performances of the consideration for any one
of the series makes the offer for that one irrevocable (see Sections 45 and 52).
Annotatson
White Sewing Machine Co. v. Poweil, 25 K. L. R. 94, 74 S. W 746
(1903), Aitken v. Lang's Adm., 106 Ky. 652, 51 S. W 154 (1899)accord.

Section 4b. REVOCATION OF OFFER FOR UNILATERAL CONTRACT, EFFECT OF PART PERFORMANCE OR TENDER.
if an offer for a unilateral contract is made, and part of
the consideration requested in the offer is given or tendered by
the offeree in response thereto, the offeror is bound by a contract, the duty of immediate performance of which is conditional on the full consideration being given or tendered within
the tune stated in the offer, or, if no tune is stated thereto,
within a reasonable tune.
Conment
a. What is rendered must be part of the actual performance requested in order to preclude revocation under this section. Beginning preparations though they may be essential to
carrying out the contract or to accepting the offer, is not enough.
b. Tender, however, is sufficient. Though not the equivalent of performance, nevertheless it is obviously unjust to allow
so late withdrawal. There can be no actionable duty on the part
of the offeror until he has received all that he demanded, or
until the condition is excused by his own prevention of performance by refusing a tender; but he may become bound at an
earlier day It may be fairly contended that the main offer ineludes as a subsidiary promise, necessarily implied, that if part
of the requested performance is given, the offeror will not revoke
his offer, and that if tender is made it will be accepted. Part
perf rmance or tender may thus furnish consideration for the
subsidiary promises. Moreover, merely acting in justifiable
reliance on an offer may in some cases serve as sufficient reason
for making a promise binding (See Section 90)
Annotation
This principle has not been clearly stated by the courts but it has
seemingly been applied where there has been a part performance by

A. L.
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the offeree. The explanation is that since part performance -creates
reciprocal obligations the offer is thereafter irrevocable and it is further
said that both parties are bound to perform. Loutsville and Nashville
R. Co. v. Coyle, 123 Ky. 854 (1906), 97 S. W 772,- 99 S. W 237 (holding that an offer to buy all ties delivered at a certain place within
the next twelve months can not be withdrawn after some ties were delivered and accepted). See also Ayer &5Lord Tie Co. v. O'Bannon & Co.,
164 Ky. 34, 174 S. W 783 (1915), and dictum in Chesbrough v. Vizard
Inv. Co., 156 Ky. 149, 154, 160 S. W. 725, as to agreements with brokers.
But where there is an offer to buy two distinct and separate things,
the shipment of one does not form a contract as to the other. Courtney
Shoe Co. v. Curd & Son, 142 Ky. 219, 134 S. W 146 (1911).
It seems probable that a tendered performance is not sufficient as
it may be refused and the offer withdrawn. Citizens Nat'l Life Ins. v.
Murphy, 154 Ky. 88, 156 S. W 1069 (1913).

Section 46.

OFFERS WHICH AR
R

T

sELvEs CONTRACTS

CANNOT BE TERLIINATED.

An offer for which such consideration has been given or
received as is necessary to make a promise binding, or wich
is m such form as to make a promise in the offer binding irrespective of consideration, cannot be terminated during the
time fixed in the offer itself or, if no time is fixed, within a.
reasonable time, either by revocation or by the offeror's death
or insanity
Annotation
Cases involving this section are not numerous and no Kentucky
decision has been found. This is probably due to the fact that the
cases generally involve an offer under seal and in this state the distinction between sealed and unsealed instruments has been abolished.

Section 47

OpFERs WHICH O'FERoR

HAS

COLLATERALLY

CONTRACTED TO KEEP OPEN CANNOT BE TER=INATED.

An offer cannot be terminated during the term therein
stated, or if no term is therein stated for a reasonable time,
either by revocation or by the offeror's death or insanity, if by
a collateral contract the offeror has undertaken not to revoke
the offer.

Cowlrent
a. The promise of the offer itself may be a contract (see
Sections 24, 46) For practical purposes the situation is the
same where the offer is accompamed by a collateral contract to
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keep the offer open. This collateral contract is m effect specifically enforced without suit by denying the offeror the power
to terminate his offer.
b. 'Whether a contract based on such an offer as is within
the rule stated either in this section or m Section 46 can itself
be specifically enforced, or, if not, what damages are recoverable
if the offeror repudiates or refuses to perform the contract, is
determined by the law governing the performance of contracts.
Annotation
This section deals with options. Although the term "option" has
been applied to any offer accompanied by a promise to keep the offer
open irrespective of consideration. -itz v. Goosling, 93 Ky. 185, 19 S.
W 527 (1892), the later tendency has been to use the word only when
the promise to hold the offer open is'based on a sufficient consideration. Thompson & Go. v. Retd, 31 K. L. R. 176, 101 S. W 964 (1907),
Caskey v. Williams Bros., 227 Ky. 73, 11 S. W (2d) 991 (1928). This
section applies only to those cases where there is a collateral contract,
that is where there is consideration for the promise to keep the offer
open, as a bare promise to keep an offer open is without legal effect and
the offer may be withdrawn at the pleasure of the offeror. Noble v.
Mann, 32 K. L. R. 30, 105 S. W 152 (1907), Stamper v. Combs, 164
Ky. 733, 176 S. W 178 (1915). But if the offer is not withdrawn, it continues and may be accepted within the time limited regardless of the
fact that there was no consideration for the promise to keep it open.
Thompson & Co. v. Reid, supra. This view seemed to have escaped the
court in some of the earlier cases. (For example see Boucher v. Van
Buskirk, 9 Ky. (2 A. K. M.) 345 (1820), and Litz v. Goosling, supra.)
There seems to be doctrine, not frequently found elsewhere, as to
the consideration for these collateral agreements. In line with the
general rule it is said that consideration "may consist in money paid,
or to to be paid for it, or in property, services, or counter benefit accruing to the owner or disadvantage incurred by the optionee; in
short, it may be such consideration as will support any other sort of
contract." Thompson & Co. v. Reid, supra. See also Bacon v. Kentucky
Central Ry. Co., 95 Ky. 373, 25 S. W 747 (1894). When connected with
a lease it may be rent to be paid by the lessee of the land or expenses to
be incurred in making it productive. Bank of Louisville v. Baum2ester,
87 Ky. 6, 7 S. W 170 (1888). But it has been consistently held that
one dollar is not sufficient consideration to support a promise to keep
an offer to sell land or coal rights open for several months. The courts
say "Such a consideration is so flagrantly disproportionate to the value
of the privilege in these cases-the options extending over a yearthat it is merely nominal. It is not substantial, and the parties could
not have regarded it as in any sense an equivalent of the privilege
which was being contracted for." Thompson & Co. v. Reid, supra at
p. 178. See also Litz v. Goosling, Noble v. Mann, Stamper v. Combs,
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supra, and Berry v. Frsbze, 120 Ky. 337, 86 S. W 558 (1905). But see
Sparkcs v. Bitter, 204 Ky. 623, 265 S. W 26 (1924).
In this section it is said that where there is such a collateral contract the offer is irrevocable. It would probably be so treated in Kentucky. In most cases it is immaterial since the damages would be the
same and an action could be maintained on the collateral contract.
The question can arise in a suit for specific performance, but even
then the aid of equity may be denied on other grounds. This is true
in Boucher v. Van Buslzrk and Litz v. Goosling, supra, which are cited
as authority for the statement that these offers are revocable in Kentucky. Specific performance was granted after an attempted revocation in Chesbroughv. Vizard Inv. Co., 156 Ky. 149, 160 S. W. 725 (1913).
An option to renew a lease is not terminated by the death of the lessor
before exercise of the option. Graham v. Rice, 203 Ky. 614, 262 S. W
968,(1924). A counter-offer by the optionee does not prevent a later
acceptance of the offer. Caskey
C
v. Williams Bros., 227 Ky. 73, 11 S. W
(2d) 991 (1928).
Our courts have distinguished between options to buy and agreements with brokers giving an exclusive agency for a definite period,
holding that the latter, although given for a consideration, are revocable at the will of the owner. Faraday Coal & Coke Co. v. Owens,
26 K. L. R. 243, 80 S. W. 1171 (1904). See also Chesbrough v. Vizard
7nv. Co., 156 Ky. 149, 160 S. W. 725 (1913).

Section 48. TERMINATION oF OFFER BY OFFEROR'S DETH
OR INSANITY.

A revocable offer is terminated by the offeror's death or
such insanity as depraves hin of legal capacity to enter into
the proposed contract.
Annotation
The law of Kentucky is in accord with this statement. The death
of the offeror terminates the offer although the offeree may be ignorant
of the death at the time of the attempted acceptance. Aitken, Son &
Co. v. Lang's Adm., 106 Ky. 652, 51 S. W 154 (1899) (continuing guaranty). This statement is not to be confused with the law applicable
to the discharge of an existing contract because of the death or insanity of one of the parties. Death of the lessor before the expiration
of a lease will not terminate the contract right of the lessee to renew.
Graham v. Rice, 203 Ky. 614, 262 S. W. 968 (1924).

Section 49. TERM±iATION oF OFFER BY DEATH OF ESSENTIAL
PERSON OR DESTRUCTION OF EssNTiAT THING.
Where a proposed contract requres for its performance
the existence of a specific person or thing, and before acceptance the person dies or the thing is destroyed, the offer is

K. L. J.-3
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terminated unless the offeror assumes the risk of such mischance.
cGomment
a. If the essential person is not dead, but ill or otherwise
apparently disabled or the essential thing is injured, it cannot
be said that the offer is automatically terminated, though such
facts may justify the offeror in refusing to fulfill any contract
formed by acceptance.
Annotaton
No Kentucky decisions directly in point have been found. It is
probable that the statement would be followed should such a case arise
as the proposition here may-be compared with the discharge of contracts by subsequent destruction of the subject matter. Brown & Long
v. Childs & Co., 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 314 (1865), with the additional element
of mistake where the destruction is before the'contract is formed. As
applied to sales of goods, this section is covered by Kentucky Statutes,
Sec. 2651b-7.
Section 50.

TERmInATION Op AN OFFaa By ILLEGALiTy.

Where after making of an offer and before acceptance the
proposed contract becomes illegal the offer is terminated.
Annotatton
There are no Kentucky decisions in point. This statement would
probably be followed as it is a type of impossibility plus the element
of illegality. This may be compared with the situation where after
acceptance but before performance the act bargained for has becolne
illegal, as in L. d NV.R. R. Co. v. Crowe, 156 Ky. 27, 160 S. W 759
(holding no recovery on contract).
Section 51. EFFECT OF DELAY n CommuNcATION oF OFFER.

If communication of an offer to the offeree is delayed, the
period within which a contract can be created by acceptance
is not thereby extended if the offeree knows or has reason to
know of the delay, though it is due to the fault of the offeror;
but if the delay is due to the fault of the offeror or to the means
of transmission adopted by hin, and the offeree neither knows
nor has reason to know that there has been delay a contract
can be created by acceptance within the period which would
have been permissible if the offer had been despatched at the
tine that its arrival seems to indicate.

A. L. I.
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Annotation
There do not seem to be any Kentucky cases involving the validity
of an acceptance of a delayed offer, However, there are statements
in our definitions of a reasonable time for acceptance which support
this proposition. See Moxley's Adm. v. Mox7ey, 59 Ky. (2 Mete.) 309
(1859), and Paducah Packing Co. v. J. T. Polk Co., 30 K. L. R. 979, 99
S. W 929 (1907).

Section 52. ACCEPTANCE OF OFFm DFxinD.

Acceptance of an offer is an expression of assent to the
terms thereof made by the offeree m a manner requested or
authorized by the offeror. If anything except a promise is
requested as consideration no contract exists until part of what
is requested is performed or tendered. If a promise is requested, no contract exists, except as qualified by Section 63,
until that promise is expressly or impliedly given.
Comment
a. In a unilateral contract the act requested and performed
as consideration for the contract ordinarily indicates acceptance
as well as furnishes the consideration, and, under Section 45,
performing or tendering part of what is requested may both
indicate assent and furnish consideration. In a proposal for a
bilateral contract the mere assent of the offeree, whether manifested by words or acts, is by implication the promise requested
and therefore here also mutual assent and consideration are indicated by the offeree at one and the same time.
b. A bilateral contract by definition consists of mutual
promises. It is therefore essential that the offeree shall give the
promise requested by the offeror. and doing this clearly indicates
acceptance of the offer. The fact that this promise is given may
be shown by any words or acts which indicate the offeree's assent to the proposed bargain.
c. As appears from Section 64 acceptance may be complete as soon as it is started on its way
Annotation
Tbis section defines acceptance in general terms. Much of the material bearing on the -definition is contained in the annotations to the
subsequent sections referred to below. The definition may be divided
into three separate statements:
(1) "Acceptance of an offer is an expression of assent to the
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terms thereof made by the offeree in a manner requested or authorized
by the offeror." The decisions in Kentucky are in accord with this
statement. As to the necessity of an expression of assent, see Section
20 (1), supra. As to silence or inaction as an expression of assent,
see Section 72, infra. The assent must be to the terms of the offer, see
Section 58, infra. If the offer is made to several persons looking to a
contract with all of them jointly, no contract is formed until it is
accepted by all. Burton v. Shotwell, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 271 (1877).
(2)
"If anything except a promise is requested as consideration,
no contract exists until part of what is requested is performed or
tendered." This statement finds support in the decisions of this state.
No contract exists until the act is performed. Stembrtdge v. Stembrzdge's Adm., 87 Ky. 91, 7 S. W 611 (1888), and conversely, a contract is formed when the requested act is completed. Jefferson Woodwork ng Co. v. Mercke, 222 Ky. 476, 1 S. W. (2d) 532 (1927), Paragon
Oil Co. v. Hughes & Sons, 193 Ky. 532, 236 S. W 963 (1922). However,
tender of performance may not be sufficient. Citizens' Nat. Life Ins.
Co. v. Murphy, 154 Ky. 88, 156 S. W 1069 (1913). In general, it is
questionable whether part performance has any legal effect, makes
the offer irrevocable, or completes the contract. The few Kentucky decisions have seemingly taken the view stated here, that a contract is
formed. In reaching this result, the court assumed there was a
bilateral contract, that part performance implied a promise to use reasonable diligence in completing the act. See the annotations under
Section 45, supra.
But an offer to enter into a unilateral contract cannot be made
into a bilateral contract by a promise .to do the act. Steadman v.
.Guthrie, 61 Ky. (4 Metc.) 147 (1862).
(3)
"If a promise is requested, no contract exists, except as
qualified by Section 63, until that promise is expressly or impliedly
given." The Kentucky cases are in accord with this statement. In
most cases the giving of the promise is necessary to satisfy the requirement of consideration as well as that of agreement. The giving
of the promise probably includes the additional requirement that it
be actually or constructively communicated. See Hopkzns v. Phoenzx
Fire Ins. Co., 200 Ky. 365, 254 S. W 1041 (1923), Kentucky Portland
Cement Co. v. Steckel, 164 Ky. 420, 175 S. W 663 (1915). The promise
may be impliedly given, see the annotations of Section 5, supra, for
implied promises generally, and Section 72, infra, as to implication by
silence or inaction. Acceptance of an order generally implies a promise
to fill it, but this is not true of the usual taking of an order by a
traveling salesman. John Matthews' Appar Co. v. Renz - Henry, 22
K. L. R. 1528, 61 S. W 9 (1901), even when the order is received and
acknowledged by the company, and notice of rejection is withheld
several days. Courtney Shoe Co. v. Curd & Son, 142 Ky. 219, 134 S. W.
146 (1911), but see Bluegrass Cordage Co. v. Luthy & Co., 98 Ky. 583,
33 S. W 835 (1896). (Failure to repudiate an order in 12 days held
to be an acceptance.) And where a cash payment has been received
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with the order, a contract will be formed if the company falls to reject
the order and return the money within a reasonable time. Enterprise
Mfg. Co. v. Campbell, 12;L S. W 1040 (1909).

Section 53. NECEsSITY FOR KNOWLEDGE OF OF'm
The whole consideration requested by the offer must be
given after the offeree knows of the offer.
Anotatson
This statement would probably be followed as a general rule, and
it was followed in an early case involving a reward. Lee v. Trustees
of Flemingsburg, 37 Ky. (7 Dana) 28 (1838), and although later cases
have denied its applibation to reward cases. Auditor v. Ballard, 72 Ky.
(9 Bush) 572; Coffey v. Commonwealth, 18 K. L. R. 646, 37 S. W 575
(1896), this does not seriously impair the validity of the rule since
courts often treat offers of rewards with undue liberality.
Most of our cases have involved acts done not only before knowledge of the offer, but before the offer was in fact made. As a general
rule these acts are not consideration. Phillips v. Rudy, 146 Ky. 780,
143 S. W. 397 (1912), Howard v. McNeil, 25 K. L. R. 1394, 78 S. W.
142 (1904). But even here certaih exceptions have been engrafted as
in the familiar housekeeper cases. Greenup v. Wilhoite, 212 Ky. 465,
279 S. W 665 (1926), and in the reward cases. Coffey v. Comnonwealth, supra, at least where part of the acts were done after the offer
was made. This principle is not involved where there is a request and
,expectation to pay, followed by the act and still later by the express
promise, since in these cases the implied offer precedes the-consideration. Some of the older cases show traces of the idea that a moral
duty is sufcient to support a later promise. Price v. Towsey, 13 Ky.
(3 Litt.) 423 (1823), Weihing v. Kurfes, 12 K. L. R. 893 (1891). See
also Section 75, infra.

Section 54. Wno MAY ACCEPT A OFERm.
A revocable offer can be accepted only by or for the benefit of the person to whom it is made.
Comment
a. The words "for the benefit of" are inserted to cover
such contracts as are permitted by Section 75 (2), namely those
m which the offeror's promise to B is conditional on an act being
done or a promise made by C in exchange for the offeror's
promise. C's act or promise is an acceptance.
b. An offer may also be accepted by an agent of the
offeree, and even if one who accepts, purporting to be such an
agent, is not authorized by the offeree so to do, his act may be
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ratified, but throughout the restatement of tins subject it is
assumed, in the absence of contrary statement, that any necessary act may be- done by an agent.
Annotation
No Kentucky cases involving attempted acceptance by one who is
not the offeree have been found. If the offer is made to several looking
to a contract with all, it must be accepted by all before there is a contract with any. Burton v. Shortwel, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 271 (1877),
This section applies only to revocable offers. Irrevocable offers, such
as options, may be accepted by the assignee. Chesbrough v. TVizard Inv.
Co., 156 Ky. 149, 160 S. W 725 (1913), see also Sections 155 and 160,
infra.
An offer addressed to the public may be accepted by any person.
This is illustrated by the reward cases cited in the annotation to Section 53, supra. And although the offer is addressed to one person, it
may be accepted by any within the class of persons for whose benefit
it is made. This is illustrated by a general guaranty of credit in
Kincheloe v. Holmes, Sturgeon & Co., 46 Ky. (7 B. M.) 5 (1846).

Section 55.

ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER FOR UNILATERAIJ CON-

TRACT, NECESsITY OF INTENT TO ACCEPT.

If an act or forbearance is requested by the offeror as the
consideration for a unilateral contract, the act or forbearance
must be given with the intent of accepting the offer.
Comment
a. When an offeror requests a certain act or forbearance
as the consideration for ins promise, the act or forbearance
when furmshed is an ambiguous expression of intent, since acts,
like words, often have more than one objective meanig. The
reasonable interpretation may be that the offeree accepts the
proposal, but it is possible that the true interpretation is that
the offeree as a free-man has exercised his privilege of acting
or forbearing in the manner requested, without accepting the
proposal. The only way to determine what his conduct actually
means even objectively, is to ascertain ins intent.
b. This is not the same as saying that the offer must be
the cause of the acceptance. The offer is, indeed, usually the
sole cause of the acceptance; but frequently there are other
causative factors, and occasionally contracts may exist where if
the offer is in any sense a cause of the acceptor's action it is
so slight a factor that a statement that the acceptance is caused
by the offer is misleading.
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c. Except to the extent stated m Sections 71 and 72, no
question of intent to accept by words or acts apparently indicating assent arises when a bilateral contract is proposed. If,
in accordance with Section 20, air offeree does act with intent
to do them which indicate his assent to an offer of a bilateral
contract communicated to hnm as required by Section 23, the
offeree comes under a duty to the-offeror; and as he is bound
by the contract, he is also entitled to take advantage of it. Indbed, this is a necessary consequence of the axiom that both
parties to bilateral contract must be bound or neither is bound.
Whereas when a unilateral contract is proposed and the offeree
does the act requested, he may do it either to make a gift or a
bargain.
Annotatwn
This statement would be followed in Kentucky. The guaranty
cases insist there must be an intention to accept the guaranty at the
time the credit is extended. This intent may be established by the
fact that the creditor requested the guaranty. See McGowan v. Wells'
Trustee, 184 Ky. 772, 775, 213 S. W 573 (1919), and other cases cited
in the next section, many going so far as to require notice of this intention.
Where an offer may be implied, as from a request or the receipt
of benefits, it is clear that the benefits must be furnished with the
intent to accept, and, if done as a gratuity, a contract will not be
formed. St. Joseph's Orphan Soczety v. Wohpert, 80 Ky. 86 (1882),
Miller v. Cropper, 16 K. L. R. 395 (1894).

Section 56. ACCEPTANCE OF OFER FOR UNATERAL CoNTRACT, NEcESSITY oF NoTIcE TO OFFEROR.
Where forbearance or an act other than a promise is the
consideration for a promise, no notification that~the act or forbearance has been given is necessary to complete the contract.
But if the offeror has no adequate means of ascertaining with
reasonable promptness and certainty that the act or forbearance has been given, and the offeree should know this, the
contract is discharged unless within a reasonable time after
performance of the act or forbearance, the offeree exercises
reasonable diligence to notify the offeror thereof.
Comment
a. In the formation of a unilateral contract where the
offeror is the party making the promise, as is almost invariably
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the case, a compliance with the request m the offer fulfills the
double function of a manifestation of acceptance and of giving
consideration. It is only m the exceptional case where the
offeror has no convenient means of ascertaining whether the requested act has been done that notice is requisite. Even then,
it is not the notice which creates the contract, but lack of the
notice which ends the duty
Annotation
This section states a general principle and an exception to it.
The general principle would probably be followed in this state.
Although no cases in direct support have been found, there are dicta to
the effect that notification is not generally an essential part of the
acceptance of an offer to enter into an unilateral contract. Steadman
v. Guthrze, 61 Ky. (4 Metc.) 147 (1862), Hopksns v. Phoenzx Fire Ins.
Co., 200 Ky. 365, 254 S. W 1041 (1923).
The exception, which requires notice if the offeror has no adequate
means of ascertaining with reasonable promptness and certainty that
the act or forbearance has been given, presents a matter of greater
difficulty. This question usually arises in connection with guaranties
of future credits and our decisions in regard to this are sadly confused.
In an early case reasonable notice of advances made under a general
letter of credit was required, and a petition by the creditor which did
not contain this averment was held to be defective. Kincheloe v.
Holmes, 46 Ky. (7 B. M.) 5 (1846). There was language in this decision which resulted in the requirement that there be notice of the
intention to accept. In Lowe v. Beckwith, 53 Ky. (14 B. M.) 150 (1853),
notice of intent was required but notice of extension of credit was
said to be unnecessary. This is an unfortunate confusion with bilateral
contracts and is based on a misconception of the reason for requiring
notice in these cases, but the requirement has become well grounded
in our law (see Bell v. Kellar, 52 Ky. (13 B. M.) 381 (1852), Steadman
v. cruthrze, 61 Ky. (4 Mete.) 147 (1862), Thompson v. Glover 38Ky. 193
(1879), Greer Machine Co. v. Sears, 23 K. L. R. 2025, 66 S. W 521
(1902), Hughes v. Roberts-Johnson - Rand Shoe Co., 24 K. L. R. 2003,
72 S. W 799 (1903), and McGowan v. Wells' Trustee, 184 Ky. 772, 213
S. W 573 (1919) (Limiting to "conditional" guarantees). In many
decisions it is apparent that notification that credit has been given, if
given seasonably, would satisfy the requirement of notice of an intent
to accept. Notice of extension of credit is required so that the guarantor may not only know the person to whom the debt is owed, but
that he may know the amount of the debt. Mere notice of intention to
accept the guaranty should not be sufficient and although Lowe v.
Beckwith declared that notice after the transaction' was unnecessary,
It is followed by a line of cases requiring notice of the specific advances. Estey v. Murphy, 7 K. L. R. 596 (1886), Gano v. Farmers'
Bank, 103 Ky. 508, 45 S. W 519 (1898), Ford, Eaton d Co. v. Harris,
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19 K. L. R. 1236, 43 S. W 199 (1897). These cases are in turn followed
by decisions denying the necessity of such notice, saying that a promise
to pay on the default of the principal is an absolute guaranty and no
notice of acceptance is required (see White Sewing Mach. Co. v. Powell,
25 K. L. R. 94, 74 S. W. 746 (1903), Watkins Med. Co. v. Brand, 143
Ky. 468, 136 S. W 867 (1911)). This is followed in the most recent
case found-McGowan v. Wells' Trustee, supra-in which it is said that
no notice of the transaction is necessary if the guaranty is "absolute"
or a "primary obligation" and for this purpose distinguishes between
guaranties of payment, which are said to be absolute, and guaranties
of collection or solvency which require notice of the transaction. These
decisions indicate an unexplined tendency to extend the rule and
classification applicable to notice of default so as to cover notice of
acceptance.
Notice may be waived by the guarantor. Mast, Crowell d Kirkpatrick v. Lehman, 100 Ky. 464, 38 S. W 1056 (1897), Ford, Eaton d
Co. v. Harris,19 K. L. R. 1236, 43 S. W 199 (1897), Hughes v. Roberts,
Johnson d *Rand Shoe Co., supra. And although the guarantor is not
bound to enquire, if he does have actual notice, from whatever source
obtained, he can not require formal notification from the creditor.
This is true where the advancement of credit is contemporaneous with
the guaranty, or where the two transactions are closely connected. It
seems that this notice may be presumed where the guarantor is an
officer and stockholder in the debtor company, where he has an interest
In the profits, or is otherwise in close contact or near relationship
with the debtor. And it is said that notice is not required where
the creditor requests the guaranty, or where a separate consideration
is paid to the guarantor (see PittsburghPlate Glass Co. v. Cassidy, 194
Ky. 81, 238 S. W 172 (1922), McGowan v. Wells' Trustee, supra; Greer
Machine Go. v. Sears, supra; Ford, Eaton & Co. v. Harris,supra; Gano
v. Farmers'Bank, supra; Thompson v. Glover, 78 Ky. 193 (1897)).
It is to be noted that, according to this section, failure to give
notice will not prevent the formation of the contract, but will result
in its discharge. Although the confusion with bilateral contracts has
often caused the courts to say that notice is essential to the formation
of the contract, it is admitted that the contract is created upon the
first extension of credit-Ford, Eaton d Co. v. Harris, supra-and that
after the act, the offer can not be withdrawn. Kincheloe v. Holmes,
supra.
Notice to a common carrier that goods have been placed in its
control is necessary before it becomes liable as an insurer. Pittsburg
C. C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. American Tob. Co., 126 Ky. 582, 104 S. W 377
(1907). See also Dunnngton v. L. & N1. R. B. Co., 153 Ky. 388, 155 S. W
750 (1913).

Section 57. UNAmRATI

CONTRACT WHERE PROPOSED ACT

O mo.
If m an offer of a unilateral contract the proposed act or

IS TO BE DONE BY
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forbearance is that of the offeror, the contract is not complete
until the offeree makes the promise requested.
comment
a. Tns section covers a particular and rather peculiar case
covered by the more general language of Section 52. It occurs
only where the performance of the offer automatically occurs at
the moment the promise requested is given. Tins may happen
where the proposal relates to the transfer of personal property
The very act of the acceptor in promising to pay the price may,
if the offer so specifies, transfer the ownersnp of the goods to
the offeree.
Annotation
Any decision involving these unusual facts would probably agree
with this statement. In Kernan v. Carter, 31 K. L. R. 865, 104 S. W
308 (1907), a contract for drilling a well provided that the plaintiff
would sink a second well for a stated price. The owner of the land
had a second well drilled by another. It was held that no contract was
formed with the plaintiff in regard to the second well unless and until
the land owner signified his assent to the proposal.

Section 58. ACCEPTACE MUST BE UNEqUivoCAL.
Acceptance must be unequivocal in order to create a contract.
Comment
a. An offeror is entitled to know m clear terms whether
the offeree accepts his proposal. It is not enough that the words
of a reply justify a probable inference of assent.
Annotation
Kentucky cases are in accord with tlns section and require that
the acceptance be positive and unambiguous. Allen v. Roberts, 5 Ky.
(2 Bibb.) 98 (1810), Hudson v. Arnold, 29 K.I L. R. 375, 93 S. W 42
(1906), Combs v. Hazard Ice & S. Co., 218 Ky. 29, 290 S. W 1035 (1927).
An acknowledgment of the receipt of an order transmitted through a
traveling salesman is not an acceptance although accompanied by the
statement that it will receive prompt and careful attention. Courtney
Shoe Co. v. Curd & Son, 142 Ky. 219, 134 S. W 146 (1911)-.

Section 59.

AccEPTANcE MUST ConLY WrI

TERms or

OFFE.

Except as this rule is qualifited by Sections 45, 63, 72, an
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acceptance must comply exactly with the reqirements of the
offer, omitting nothing from the promse or performance requested.
Comment
a. Tins rule is a necessary corollary of the basic idea of
contracts that duties are -nposed by the law for only such performance as the parties have expressed a willingness to assume.
Annotation
Caskey v. Williams Bros., 227 Ky. 73, 11 S. W (2d) 991 (1928),
Shaw v. Ingram-Day Jbr Co., 152 Ky. 329, 153 S. W 431 (1913), New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Levy, 122 Ky. 457, 92 S. W 325 (1906), Hutcheson
v. Blakeman, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 80 (1860) accord.
The cases involving rewards again make a slight exception to tins
rule and it has been held that a statute which offers a reward for the
capture and return of an escaped convict is satisfied by the return of
one who has voluntarily surrendered to the claimant for the purpose
of being returned. Mudd v. Woodszde, 136 Ky. 296, 124 S. W 321 (1910).

Section 60. PURPORTED ACCEPTANCE WHICH ADDS QumiFICATIONS.

A reply to an offer, though purporting to accept it, which
adds qualifications or requires performance of conditions, is
not an acceptance but is a counter-offet.
Comment
a. A qualified or conditional acceptance is a counter-offer,
since such an acceptance is a statement of what the person making it is willing to do in exchange for what the original offeror
proposed to give. A counter-offer is a rejection of the original
offer (see Section 38 and comment thereon) An acceptance,
however, is not inoperative as such merely because it is expressly
conditional, if the requirement of the condition would be implied from the offer, though not expressed therein.
Annotation
The Kentucky cases are in exact accord with this statement.
Caskey v. Williams Bros., 227 Ky. 73, 11 S. W. (2d) 991 (1928), Cincnnati Equip. Co. v. Big Muddy R. Coal Co., 158 Ky. 247, 164 S. W
794 (1914), Shaw v. Ingrain-Day Lbr Co., 152 Ky. 329, 153 S. W 431
(1913), L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Coyle, 123 Ky. 854, 97 S. W 772 (1906),
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Levy, 122 Ky. 457, 92 S. W 325 (1906),
Hutcheson v. Blakeman, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 80 (1860), Hartford Life Ins.
Co. v. Milet, 31 K. L.-R. 1297, 105 S. W 144 (1907).
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However, if the acceptance, although conditional in form, merely
states terms that are implied in the offer, it is unqualified and completes the contract. Postal Telg. Cable Co. v. Louisville Cotton Oil Co.,
186 Ky. 843, 122 S. W 852 (1909). (Custom of the trade may be read
into the offer.) And failure to object to the conditions is evidence
that they were impliedly a part of the offer. Fazrmont Glass Works v.
Crunden-Martin WV W Co., 106 Ky. 659, 51 S. W 196 (1899).

Section 61. ACCEPTANCE oF OFFER WHICH STATES PLACE,
TIME OR MANNER oF ACC TANCE.
If an offer prescribes the place, time or manner of acceptance its terms in this respect must be complied with in order
to create a contract. If an offer merely suggests a permitted
place, time or manner of acceptance, another method of acceptance is not precluded.
Comment
a. If the offeror prescribes the only way n which his offer
must be accepted, an acceptance in any other way is a counteroffer. But frequently in regard to the details of methods of
acceptance, the offeror's language, if fairly interpreted, amounts
merely to a statement of a satisfactory method of acceptance,
without positive requirement that this method shall be followed.
Annotatson
If the offer prescribes the time of acceptance, an attempted acceptance at a later time is invalid. If the offer prescribes the manner of
acceptance, as delivery of a telegram, the contract is not complete when
the telegram is transmitted. Postal Tel. C. Co. v. Louisville Cotton S.
0. Co., 140 Ky. 506, 131 S. W 277 (1910). If the offer requires an act
as acceptance, a promise to do the act is not sufficient. Steadman v.
Guthrze, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 147 (1862), but a part performance may complete the contract (Section 45, supra). And when a promise is requested, performance of the act may be substituted as an acceptance
(Section 63, infra).

Section 62.

ACCEPTANCE

WHICH REQUESTS

CHANEGE

OF

TERms.

An acceptance which requests a change or addition to the
terms of the offer is not thereby invalidated unless the acceptance is made to depend on an assent to the changed or added
terms.
Annotation
No Kentucky cases involving this point have been found.
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Section 63. EFFECT OF PERFORMANCE BY OPPEREE WHERE
OFFER REQUESTS PROMISE.
If an offer requests a promise from the offeree, and the
offeree without making the pronuse actually does or tenders
what he was requested to promise to do, there is a contract,
subject to the provisions of Section 56, provided that such performance is completed or tendered within the time allowable
for accepting by making a promise. A tender in such a case
operates as a promise to render complete performance.
Comment
a. This section states an exception to Sections 52 and 59.
If within the time allowed for accepting the offer full performance has been given, the offeror has received something better
than he asked for and is bound, since the only object of requirmg a promise is ultimately to obtain performance of it. Beginning to perform within the time allowed for accepting the
offer will not amount to an acceptance, unless the offeror also
gives an assurance that performance will be completed.
Annotatiop
Our courts have followed this equitable principle in Graves v.
Smedes' Adm., 37 Ky. (7 Dana.) 344 (1838). 1
A similar situation is found where the parties have attempted to
enter into a bilateral contract but the contract is not formed because
of a conditional acceptance (Caskey v. Williams Bros., 227 Ky. 73,
11 S. IV. (2d) 991), the required promise is illusory (Rehm-Zeihlier Co.
v. Walker Co., 156 Ky 6, 160 S. W 777), or because of the incapacity
of one of the parties (Hoffman v. Colgan, 25 K. L. 1R. 98, 74 S. W 724).
In these cases it is held that performance by the party. not bound is
sufficient to bind the other and obviates the lack of verbal agreement.
The converse of this statement is not true. If there is an offer to
enter into an unilateral contract, a promise to do the required act is
not sufficient. Steadman v. Guthrze, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 147 (1862).

Section 64. How ACCEPTANCE MAY BE TRANSMITTED, TIME
WmN IT TAKES EFFECT.

An acceptance may be transmitted by any means which
the offeror has authorized the offeree to use and, if so transmitted, is operative and completes the contract as soon as put
out of the offeree's possession, without regard to whether it
ever reaches the offeror.
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Annotation
This section is applicable only when an authorized means of transmission. is used. As to when a means is impliedly authorized, see
Section 66, infra.
The law of Kentucky is in accord with this statement. C. W Craig
Co. v. Thos. S. Jones & Co., 200 Ky. 113, 252 S. W. 574 (1923), N. W
C
Mut. ife Ins. Co. v. Joseph, 31 K. L. R. 714, 103 S. W. 317 (1907)
(Death of offeree after mailing of acceptance and before receipt.),
Carter v. Hibbard, 26 K. L. R. 1033, 83 S. W 112 (1904) (Acceptance
lost in mails.), Chiles v. Nelson, 37 Ky. (7 Dana.) 281 (1838). The
statement in this section is followed in all respects by the dictum in
Postal Teg. 0. Co. v. Louisville Cotton Seed Oil Co., 140 Ky. 506, 131
S. W 277 (1910). See also dictum in Shaw v. Ingram-Day Lbr Co.,
152 Ky. 329, 153 S. W 431 (1913), Fairmont Glass Works v. CrundenMartin WV IV Co., 106 Ky. 659, 51 S. W 196 (1899), Hutcheson V.
Blakeman, 60 Ky. (3 Met.) 80 (1860)
An insurance contract is completed when the policy is mailed to
the insured. N. TV Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Joseph, supra (dictum), but
not when it is mailed to an agent of the company. Provident S. L. A.
Soc. v. Elliott's Exr., 29 K. L. R. 552, 93 S. W 659 (1906).
However, if the offeror demands actual communication, receipt or
delivery of the acceptance, the contract does not arise until it is received. Postal Telg. C. Co. v. Louisville Cotton Seed Oil Co., supra.
But it has been held that a counter-offer containing the words "notify
me at once" may be accepted by the mailing of the notification although
it is lost in the mails and actual notice is not received for about a
month. Carter v. Hibbard, supra.

Section 65. ACCEPTANCE BY TELEPHONE.
Acceptance given by telephone is governed by the principles applicable to oral acceptances where the parties are in the
presence of each other.
Annotatson
This statement is supported in Sullivan v. HaVkendall, 82 Ky. 483
(1885). (Holding, however, that when an operator acts for either of
the parties, the one speaking to the operator is bound by the message
delivered by her.).

Section 66. WEMN A PARTICULAR MEANS oF TRAswnssioN
Is AuTrnoRzED.

An acceptance is authorized to be sent by the means used
by the offeror or customary in similar transactions at the time
when and the place where the offer is received, unless the terms
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of the offer or surrounding circumstances known to offeree
otherwise indicate.
Annotation
Kentucky decisions are in agreement with this statement. A contract is formed when an unqualified acceptance is dispatched by the
same means that were used in communicating the offer. Carter v.
Hibbard, 26 K. L. R. 1033, 83 S. W 112; Hutcheson v. .Blakeman, 60
Ky. (3 Mete.) 80; Chiles v. Nelson, 37 Ky. (7 Dana.) 281, or by a
customary method in such transactions although it is not the means
used by the offeror. Fazrmont Glass Works v. Crunden-Martin W W
Co., 106 Ky. 659, 51 S. W 196 (dictum). And of course, there may be
express authorization as in C. W Crasg & Co. v. Jones & Co., 200 Ky.
113, 252 S. W. 574.

Section 67. ACCEPTANCE BY M iL OR FROM A DISTANCE,
WHEN VALID UPON DESPATCH.
An acceptance sent by mail or otherwise from a distance
is not operative when despatched, unless it is properly
addressed and any other precaution taken which is ordinarily
observed to insure safe transmission of similar messages.

Annotation
No Kentucky cases have been found. This section would undoubtedly be applied should such a case arise.
The fact that the letter is properly addressed and stamped is
Important even when the communication must be received in order to
become effective. Huflivan v. Kuykenda7l, 82 Ky. 483 (1885) (It does
not create a presumption of receipt but is evidence for the 'jury.),
Collins v. Swan-Day Lbr Co., 158 Ky. 231, 164 S. W 813 (1914). (It
creates a presumption of receipt.).
(To be continued.)

